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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of gas pipeline capacity in mitigating regional
market power. We characterize the policy prescriptions of various control
schemes used by a network operator, and focus on transport capacity. We
start from a situation where the network operator has the ability to use
transfers, price, and capacity. We then restrict the set of available control
instruments. We first consider the case where transfers cannot be used when
setting price and capacity. Then, we examine the no-transfer no-price-control
case. Our main finding is that restricting the set of control instruments does
not necessarily lead to higher-capacity pipelines.
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1 Introduction
The opening of gas markets is underway in most of the industrialized world,
particularly so within the European Union which is lagging behind the United
States in terms of the degree of introduction of market forces in the gas indus-
try and integration of their national networks. In parallel to the launching
of vast programs of structural reforms aimed at enhancing gas-to-gas com-
petition, many European countries are heavily investing in the development
of their pipeline networks. Such investments are often justified by the need
to anticipate growth of demand, but some observers have come to question
the idea that the large investments made in capacity expansion are all that
needed.1 Given the high degree of concentration of the gas industry in Eu-
rope, the issue of the impact of transport capacity on market structure and
market power certainly deserves some attention.
The impact of transport capacity on market structure and market power
has been documented in both the institutional/empirical and the theoreti-
cal literature on energy. On the empirical front, for the case of the US gas
industry, a large stream of the literature has examined the impact of inter-
connecting sub-networks on the degree of market integration and competition
(see, e.g., Doane and Spulber, 1994, and De Vany and Walls, 1994). From a
more theoretical perspective, for the case of electricity, one line of literature
has directly examined the impact of transmission capacity on local market
power (e.g., Borenstein et al., 2000, Lautier, 2001) leading to the tentative
1See, e.g., the article by Jill Junola in www.energyintel.com entitled ”Spain Building
More Gas Import Capacity Than It Needs,” February 19, 2003.
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conclusion that transmission link expansion, even if additional links are not
actually used (Borenstein et al., 2000), is an effective policy instrument for
promoting competition.2
In an exploratory theoretical piece on the gas industry, Cremer and Laf-
font (2002) examine the possibility of building ”excess” capacity for the pur-
pose of mitigating local market power. They obtain results that are not
unambiguous although their main focus is on cases where excess capacity
arises. Our paper generalizes Cremer and Laffont’s by enlarging the set of
instruments that can be used to control regional power. We thus carry fur-
ther the analysis of the issue of over- versus under- capacity by assuming
that the latter is but one of a set of possible weapons that are available for
combating regional market power. The analysis is done within a simple the-
oretical framework the basic ingredients of which are presented in the next
section.
In section 3 we characterize the policy prescriptions of a control scheme
of a gas supplier by the network owner/operator that is based on transfers
between consumers and the firm, price or equivalently output, and capacity.
Then, we restrain the set of available control instruments. Section 4 assumes
that transfers are not allowed and section 5 assumes that the network opera-
tor does not even have the ability to control price. In section 6, we investigate
the issue of excess capacity building in a more systematic way. We provide
2Borenstein et al. (2000) show that if the capacity of the transmission line linking two
regional markets is sufficiently large, both markets would be driven to the competitive
price. Interestingly, they also construct an example where the competitive impact of the
line on any of the two regional markets is stronger when the other market is a monopoly
than when it is competitive. The intuition is that an aggressive output strategy is more
effective in deterring imports when there is monopoly power at the other end of the line.
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and analyze in detail two of three examples considered in the paper that
allow us to highlight the role of capacity in market-power control. Section 7
summarizes our results on capacity ranking and discusses some simulations.
The last section concludes the paper and the appendix presents the results
obtained in the third example.
2 A simple two-market network configuration
Consider a regional natural gas market, market M , dominated by a single
supplier, firm m, producing output qm at cost C
m(qm). Gas is also supplied
at marginal cost c in a perfectly competitive market, market Cp, which is
geographically distinct from marketM but linked to it by means of a pipeline
of capacity K built at cost C(K) (see figure 1). In this simple two-market
configuration, gas that flows from market Cp into market M should exert
competitive pressure on the regional monopoly and hence mitigate the exer-
cise of market power by firm m in its local market.3
s sCp M
K
-
Figure 1: A simple two-market network
The analysis conducted in this paper rests on the presumption that the
transport line linking these two markets is built by the network owner/operator
for the purpose of allowing imports of gas from market Cp into market M .
3Throughout, we will assume that the price in the regional monopoly market is always
above the marginal cost in the competitive market. A sufficient condition is that the
monopolist marginal cost is above the marginal cost in the competitive market.
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Letting QM(.) represent the demand function in market M , if a quantity of
gas corresponding to full capacity of the pipeline, K, is shipped from the
competitive market into market M , the supplier in this market would be a
monopoly on the residual demand QM(pm)−K where pm is price.
We now proceed to characterize the prescriptions of various policies that
are used to control market power in the regional marketM .4 It is worthwhile
noting that, given the structure of the model, any pricing policy that is
implemented in the regional monopoly market wouldn’t affect welfare in the
competitive market since price in the latter is at the first-best (marginal-cost)
level. Hence, without loss of generality, we can ignore welfare of consumers
and firms in this competitive market.5
We start from a situation where the network operator has the ability
to control the gas supplier’s market power by means of three regulatory
instruments, namely, (possibly two-way) transfers between consumers and
the firm, price (or equivalently output), and transport capacity of the network
(section 3). We then restrict the set of regulatory instruments available to
the network operator. We first consider the case where the operator may not
use transfers when he sets the price and capacity levels (section 4). Then, we
examine the situation where besides the fact that transfers are not allowed,
the network operator looses the ability to control price (section 5).
4In this paper we assume that control of the monopoly is exercised under complete
information. In a paper in progress (Gasmi et al., 2003), we introduce asymmetric infor-
mation on the technology of gas production.
5Another factor that is also neglected in the analysis without affecting its main quali-
tative results is the marginal cost of transport. Alternatively, if marginal cost of transport
is constant it can be included in the constant c, i.e., we may write c = cp + ct where cp
is now the marginal cost of production in the competitive market and ct is the marginal
cost of transport.
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3 Control of price and capacity when trans-
fers are allowed
In this section we assume that the network operator, whose objectives coin-
cide with those of the government, may use public funds raised through taxes
to operate transfers between consumers and the firm. The economic distor-
tions (the deadweight loss) generated by taxation are captured through a
nonzero social cost of public funds λ. That is, if the network operator makes
a monetary transfer T to the firm, this transfer costs consumers (1 + λ)T .
Let S(.) represent the utility function of consumers in market M . Total
supply of gas QM(pm) in this market, composed of K units imported from
the competitive market and qm units produced locally by the firm, brings
consumers an aggregate net welfare, V ,
V = S(QM(pm))− pmQM(pm)
+(1 + λ) [(pm − c)K − C(K)]− (1 + λ)T (1)
This consumers’ net welfare is composed of three terms: the net surplus of
consumers, the social valuation of profits generated by the K units of gas
provided competitively, and the social cost of the transfer made to the firm.
As to the regional monopoly welfare, denoted U , it is given by the sum
of its profits and the transfer it receives from the network operator:
U = pm [QM(pm)−K]− Cm(QM(pm)−K) + T (2)
For the firm to be willing to supply gas at all, the network operator ought
to guarantee it a given level of utility. This participation constraint is nor-
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malized to
U ≥ 0 (3)
The utilitarian social welfare function, W , is defined as the unweighted
sum of aggregate consumers’ net welfare V and firm’s utility U :
W = V + U (4)
Substituting for V from (1) and for T from (2) yields social welfare
W = S(QM(pm)) + λpmQM(pm)
−(1 + λ) [cK + C(K) + Cm(QM(pm)−K)]− λU (5)
as the social valuation of the total production, minus its social cost, minus
the social opportunity cost of the firm’s utility. From this expression of so-
cial welfare we see that reducing the monopoly’s utility is a socially desirable
objective, for this utility includes a transfer of funds collected through dis-
tortive taxation (see (2)). Relatedly, we see from (5) that the social valuation
of total production explicitly includes the fiscal value of the revenues that it
generates.6
The regulatory program consists in maximizing social welfareW given by
(5) with respect to pm and K, under the participation constraint (3).
7 From
the expression of social welfare, we immediately see that the participation
constraint is binding. Hence, the availability of transfers allows the network
6Indeed, these revenues allow the government to lessen the need to rely on distortive
taxation.
7To be somewhat more realistic, one can assume a timing of decisions such that the
network operator sets up first the capacity level and then the price level. Solving this
problem by backward induction and using the envelope theorem yields the solution that
is characterized in Proposition 1.
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operator to extract the firm’s profit through taxation. Substituting for U = 0
in (5) and using the fact that ∂S(QM)/∂QM = pm, we obtain the following
first-order conditions:8
pmQ
′
M + λ
[
QM + pmQ
′
M
]
− (1 + λ)
[
∂Cm
∂QM
]
Q
′
M = 0 (6)
−(1 + λ)
[
c+ C
′
(K)− ∂C
m
∂QM
]
= 0 (7)
Letting η(QM) ≡ −Q′Mpm/QM , represent the price-elasticity of demand
in market M , these conditions can be rewritten as in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 1 When price (or equivalently output) and capacity are both
controlled by the network operator and the latter can use public funds to
make transfers between consumers and the firm, the following conditions are
satisfied at the optimum:
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
pm
=
λ
1 + λ
1
η(QM)
(8)
(1 + λ)
[
∂Cm
∂QM
]
= (1 + λ)
[
c+ C
′
(K)
]
(9)
From equation (8) we see that pricing obeys a standard Ramsey principle
according to which the price markup is inversely proportional to the price-
elasticity of demand.9 Equation (9) says that the social cost of having an
additional unit of gas produced locally by the firm just equals the social cost
of having this unit shipped in from the competitive market.
8To minimize notation, the arguments of some of the demand and cost functions will
be dropped in the presentation.
9A difference with the standard Ramsey-Boiteux rule though is that here the cost of
public funds λ is exogenous.
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4 Control of price and capacity when trans-
fers are not allowed
We now assume that the network operator sets the capacity and price levels
without the additional possibility of making any transfer between consumers
and the firm.10 If one assumes that this controlled price is both a ceiling and
a floor for the firm, this method of price control is of a price-cap type.11
Social welfare W is now expressed as
W = S(QM(pm))− pmQM(pm)
+(1 + λ) [(pm − c)K − C(K)]
+pm [QM(pm)−K]− Cm(QM(pm)−K) (10)
that is, as the sum of the net consumer surplus, the social value of the profits
generated by the K units imported under competitive conditions, and the
profits of the firm that now are not taxed. Gathering terms, we obtain
W = S(QM(pm)) + λpmK
−(1 + λ) [cK + C(K)]− Cm(QM(pm)−K) (11)
Cross-examining (5) and (11), we see that as he now cannot use transfers to
collect firm’s profits, the network operator assigns a fiscal value only to the
revenue (and the cost) of the K units that are provided competitively.
10In the next section, we consider the case where, in addition to not being able to use
transfers, the network operator looses the ability to control price.
11While this method of price control is of a price-cap type, in this paper it is implemented
under complete information. In our ongoing research that further explores the topic of
this paper (Gasmi et al., 2003), we consider an asymmetric information version of this
price-cap regulatory mechanism.
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Maximizing social welfare given in (11) with respect to price and capacity
yields the following first-order conditions:
pmQ
′
M + λK −
[
∂Cm
∂QM
]
Q
′
M = 0 (12)
λpm − (1 + λ)
[
c+ C
′
(K)
]
+
∂Cm
∂QM
= 0 (13)
The next proposition rewrites these conditions in a form that is comparable
with those of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 When price (or equivalently output) and capacity are both
controlled by the network operator and the latter cannot use public funds to
make transfers between consumers and the firm, the following conditions are
satisfied at the optimum:
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
pm
= λ
K
QM
1
η(QM)
(14)
(1 + λ)
[
∂Cm
∂QM
]
+ λ
[
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
]
= (1 + λ)[c+ C
′
(K)] (15)
From equation (14) we see that pricing is still such that the price markup
is inversely proportional to the demand elasticity, but is now proportional
to the share of imports from the competitive market in the total consump-
tion of gas in the monopoly market.12 Provided the standard assumption of
concavity of demand, we see from equation (13) that this latter property is
due to the fact that as the price increases, the social marginal valuation of
capacity increases.
12Note also that, as in the Ramsey formula established for the case with transfers, the
price markup is proportional to the shadow cost of public funds λ, but it is now more
sensitive to it.
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The capacity equation (15) says that, at the optimum, the social cost of
the marginal unit of gas shipped from the competitive market just equals the
social cost of having this unit produced locally plus the social opportunity
cost of its profitability for the firm. Compared to the case with transfers,
this additional term comes from the fact that monopoly profits generated by
additional units produced locally can no longer be collected by the network
operator who now lacks the instrument that would allow him to do so.13
5 The no-transfer no-price-control case
In this section we assume that the network operator lacks an additional in-
strument of control of the regional monopoly activity, namely, pricing and
can only use the level of capacity of the pipeline to counter its market power.
In practice though, we model this case as if the network operator still contin-
ues to set the price level, but now this price has to fall within a constrained
set of values. Let us be more specific.
For a given volume of gas K imported from the competitive market,
the firm remains a monopoly in its local market on the residual demand
QM(pm)−K where pm is price. Given this demand, the firm sets price so as
to maximize its profit pim given by
pim = pm [QM(pm)−K]− Cm(QM(pm)−K) (16)
13Note that this opportunity cost is for a given price pm that satisfies (14). To see that
marginal units produced locally generate a social opportunity cost, merely rewrite social
welfare asW = S+λpmQM−(1+λ)[Cm+cK+C(K)]−λpim where pim = pm(QM−K)−Cm
is firm’s profit.
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The first-order condition of this profit-maximization problem is[
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
]
Q
′
M +QM −K = 0 (17)
while the second-order condition that ensures that we are indeed at a maxi-
mum is [
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
]
Q
′′
M +
[
1− ∂
2Cm
∂Q2M
Q
′
M
]
Q
′
M +Q
′
M < 0 (18)
Given that transfers are not allowed, it is clear enough that the form of
the social welfare function for this case is analogous to the one described in
the previous section which we recall here:
W = S(QM(pm)) + λpmK − (1 + λ)[cK +C(K)]−Cm(QM(pm)−K) (19)
The optimization program that corresponds to this no-price control case
requires then maximizing (19) with respect to pm andK, under the constraint
(17).14
Letting µ designate the Lagrange multiplier associated with the firm’s
profit-maximization constraint, we obtain the following first-order conditions:
pmQ
′
M + λK −
[
∂Cm
∂QM
]
Q
′
M
−µ
{[
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
]
Q
′′
M +
[
1− ∂
2Cm
∂Q2M
Q
′
M
]
Q
′
M +Q
′
M
}
= 0 (20)
λpm − (1 + λ)[c+ C ′(K)] + ∂C
m
∂QM
+ µ
[
1− ∂
2Cm
∂Q2M
Q
′
M
]
= 0 (21)
to which the constraint (17) is appended. Rewriting these first-order condi-
tions allows us to state the following proposition:
14Strictly speaking, (18) should also be taken as a constraint. The standard way to deal
with this issue, however, is to check ex post that this second-order condition is satisfied
by the solution to the optimization problem.
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Proposition 3 When capacity only is controlled by the network operator,
the following conditions are satisfied at the optimum:
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
pm
= λ
K
QM
1
η(QM)
− µ
η(QM)

[
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
]
Q
′′
M +
[
1− ∂
2Cm
∂Q2M
Q
′
M
]
Q
′
M +Q
′
M
QM

(22)
(1 + λ)
[
∂Cm
∂QM
]
+ λ
[
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
]
= (1 + λ)[c+ C
′
(K)] + µ
[
∂2Cm
∂Q2M
Q
′
M − 1
]
(23)[
pm − ∂C
m
∂QM
]
Q
′
M +QM −K = 0 (24)
A few comments on these conditions are in order.
First, note that in this no-transfer scheme the price markup is again pro-
portional to the cost of public funds in a more sensitive way than in the
case where the network operator could use transfers (section 3). Second,
in contrast to the scheme analyzed in the previous section that gave the
network operator more freedom in pricing, we see from (21) that increas-
ing price will also have an (ambiguous) effect on the cost of violating the
profit-maximization constraint (17) induced by imports from the competi-
tive market.
Third, observe that, with respect to (14), equation (22) has an extra term
the sign of which, assuming that the second-order condition of the firm (18)
holds, is the same as that of µ, the shadow cost of the profit maximization
constraint. Finally, we see from (23) that, at the optimum, the social cost
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of having an extra unit produced locally by the monopoly, plus the social
opportunity cost of the profit this unit generates for the firm, should be
balanced against the social cost of importing this unit from the competitive
region plus the cost of the violation of the profit-maximization constraint
this imported unit induces.
As we might conclude from our discussion so far, this scheme reveals a
number of rather complex price and capacity effects that turn out to make its
comparison with the two previously analyzed schemes an interesting exercise.
Let us now turn to the comparison of these three alternative ways of com-
bating regional monopoly market power while paying a particular attention
to the role played by network transport capacity.
6 Market power and transport capacity
This section compares the three schemes analyzed in the previous section
in terms of the levels of network transport capacity they prescribe. We first
discuss the general case and then give results obtained for some special cases.
6.1 Discussion of the general case
For clarity of exposition we refer to the schemes described in section 3 (control
of price and capacity with transfers), section 4 (control of price and capacity
without transfers), and section 5 (control of capacity only) as schemes A, B,
and C respectively. Let KA, KB, and KC designate the associated optimal
levels of network capacity.
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For the purpose of comparing the capacity levels obtained under schemes
A and B, let us examine the first-order conditions (9) and (15) that, respec-
tively, characterize these two schemes. Observe that the left-hand side of
equation (15) includes an extra term that represents the social opportunity
cost of the profitability of a marginal unit produced by the firm. Since from
(14) this term is positive, assuming that the (variable) cost function of ca-
pacity building exhibits constant to decreasing returns, it is straightforward
to see that KA < KB, i.e., that non-availability of transfers in scheme B
leads to excess capacity relative to scheme A that allows for transfers.
Using a similar approach for comparing the capacities associated with
schemes B and C (see equations (15) and (23)), on the one hand, and A and
C (see equations (9) and (23)), on the other hand, we see that the ordering of
these capacities is not unambiguous. Indeed, it turns out that KB < KC if
the shadow cost of the profit-maximization constraint (17), µ, is positive, and
KB > KC otherwise.15 As to schemes A and C, we obtain that KA < KC
if the cost of violating the profit-maximization constraint by importing an
extra unit from the competitive market is lower than the social opportunity
cost of the profitability of this unit if it is produced locally by the monopoly,
and KA > KC otherwise.
Given the crucial role played in these capacity comparisons by µ, the
(endogenous) shadow cost of the firm’s profit-maximization constraint under
scheme C, it is useful to further investigate this issue under some specific
functional forms for the demand and cost functions. In the remainder of this
15This result holds under the standard assumptions of downward-slopping demand and
constant to decreasing returns firm’s technology.
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paper, we consider three commonly assumed configurations of demand and
costs. Two of these configurations are analyzed in the next two subsections.
The third one is presented in the appendix.
6.2 Case 1: Linear demand, constant returns in gas
supply, decreasing returns in capacity building
In this subsection, we consider the case where demand is linear, and the
technology of gas supply exhibits constant returns to scale while that of
capacity building has decreasing returns to scale. More specifically, let
QM(pm) = γ − pm, Cm(qm) = θqm, C(K) = ω
2
K2; γ, θ, ω > 0 (25)
Solving for the endogenous variables of the three control schemes A, B, and
C, and comparing the associated capacity levels, the following theorem can
be stated:
Theorem 1 Let demand and costs be described by (25) and KA, KB, and
KC designate optimal capacity levels achieved under schemes A, B, and C
respectively. The following provides first, pairwise orderings of the capacity
levels, and then a ranking of the three capacity levels.
i) Assume that the following conditions hold:
λ
1 + λ
<
ω
λ
(26)
c < θ < γ (27)
(1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)] > (1 + λ)θ + λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)] (28)
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Then, the pair of schemes {A,B} is ”feasible” in the sense that each scheme
of this pair yields a positive price, quantity, and capacity level.16 Further-
more, KA < KB.
ii) Assume that the same conditions as those given in i) above hold. Then,
the pair of schemes {B,C} is feasible. Moreover, if
(1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)] > (1 + λ)θ + λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c)]
+λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)] (29)
then KB < KC. Otherwise, i.e., if
(1 + λ)θ + λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)] <
(1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)] <
(1 + λ)θ + λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c)] + λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)] (30)
then KB > KC.17
iii) Assume that conditions (26), (27), and
(1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)] > (1 + λ)θ + λ(θ − c) (31)
hold. Then, the pair of schemes {A,C} is feasible. Moreover, if
(1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)] > (1 + λ)θ + 2λ(θ − c) + λ [θ − (c+ ω(γ − θ))] (32)
KA < KC. Otherwise, i.e., if
(1 + λ)θ + λ(θ − c) < (1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)] <
16Note that our definition of feasibility rules out shutting down any of the two sources
of natural gas (markets Cp and M).
17Our use of the term ”otherwise” here (and in what follows) carries some degree of
abuse of language. Indeed, the reader should realize that, for instance, condition (30)
encompasses both the reverse inequality of condition (29) and the feasibility conditions
(26)-(28).
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(1 + λ)θ + 2λ(θ − c) + λ [θ − (c+ ω(γ − θ))] (33)
then KA > KC.
iv) Assume conditions (26)-(28) given in i) hold. Then, the triple of schemes
{A,B,C} is feasible. Moreover, if condition (29) holds, then KA < KB <
KC. If (29) does not hold and (32) holds, namely,
(1 + λ)θ + 2λ(θ − c) + λ [θ − (c+ ω(γ − θ))] <
(1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)] <
(1 + λ)θ + λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c)] + λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)] (34)
then KA < KC < KB. Otherwise, if both (29) and (32) do not hold, i.e.,
(1 + λ)θ + λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)] < (1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)] <
(1 + λ)θ + 2λ(θ − c) + λ [θ − (c+ ω(γ − θ))] (35)
then KC < KA < KB. 18
Proof 1 Solving the systems of equations composed of the first-order condi-
tions associated with each of the three schemes A, B, and C, namely (6)-(7),
(12)-(13), and (20)-(21) and (17) respectively, yields the following closed-
form solutions:
pAm = θ +
[
λ
1 + 2λ
]
(γ − θ) (36)
KA =
(θ − c)
ω
(37)
qAm =
[
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
]
(γ − θ)− (θ − c)
ω
(38)
18We should indicate that nonemptiness of the interval defined by (35) requires λ(γ−c) <
2(θ − c)− ω(γ − θ) (see footnote 26).
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pBm = θ +
[
λ(1 + λ)
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) (39)
KB =
[
1 + λ
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) (40)
qBm = (γ − θ)−
[
(1 + λ)2
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) (41)
pCm = θ +
[λ+ 2ω(1 + λ)] (γ − θ)− 2(1 + λ)(θ − c)
(1 + 2λ)(1 + 2ω) + 2(λ+ ω)
(42)
KC =
(1 + 2λ)(γ − θ) + 4(1 + λ)(θ − c)
(1 + 2λ)(1 + 2ω) + 2(λ+ ω)
(43)
qCm =
[λ+ 2ω(1 + λ)] (γ − θ)− 2(1 + λ)(θ − c)
(1 + 2λ)(1 + 2ω) + 2(λ+ ω)
(44)
µ =
[ω(1 + λ)− λ2] (γ − θ)− (1 + λ)(1 + 2λ)(θ − c)
(1 + 2λ)(1 + 2ω) + 2(λ+ ω)
(45)
As to the second-order conditions (the Hessian matrix being negative definite)
which guarantee that the above solutions are local maximizers, they are always
satisfied for scheme A whereas for schemes B and C they require ω(1+ λ)−
λ2 > 0, which is equivalent to λ/(1+ λ) < ω/λ, i.e., condition (26) stated in
the theorem.
i) Examining (37) and (40), we see that pipeline capacity levels under A and
B will be positive if (26) holds and θ > c. On the other hand, (26) and γ > θ
allow us to conclude that if
(γ − θ) >
[
(1 + λ)2
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) (46)
rewritten as (28), then qBm > 0, and the latter implies that q
A
m > 0, as can
be seen from (38) and (41).19 Next, we derive the capacity gap between
schemes B and A, KB −KA, and see that it is equal to [λ2/(ω(1 + λ)− λ2)]
19Note that (26) and (27) guarantee that prices under schemes A and B are strictly
positive.
19
[(θ − c)/ω]. Finally, we observe that this capacity gap is positive within the
domain of feasibility of these two schemes.
ii) From (40) and (43), we see that if (26) and (27) hold, then KB and KC
are both positive. As to locally produced output, we see from (41) and (44)
that whenever qBm > 0, it will be the case that q
C
m > 0. Thus, (26), (27) and
(46), the latter being rewritten as (28), guarantee that the pair of schemes
{B,C} is feasible.20 Now, we calculate KC −KB and see that it is positive
if
(γ − θ) >
[
(1 + λ)(1 + 2λ)
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) (47)
which can be rewritten as (29), and negative if[
(1 + λ)2
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) < (γ − θ) <
[
(1 + λ)(1 + 2λ)
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) (48)
which can be rewritten as (30).21 As alluded to in our discussion of the gen-
eral case (see subsection 6.1), these conditions reflect the sign of µ (given by
(45)), the shadow cost of the profit-maximization constraint (17) accounted
for in scheme C. More specifically, (47) is equivalent to µ > 0 and (48) com-
bines µ < 0 with the conditions that ensure that the pair {B,C} is feasible.
iii) From (37) and (43), we see that if (26) and (27) hold, then KA > 0 and
KB > 0. Furthermore, if
(γ − θ) >
[
1 + 2λ
1 + λ
]
(θ − c)
ω
(49)
which can be rewritten as (31), holds, then qAm > 0 and the pair of schemes
20Note that (27) ⇒ pBm > 0 and qCm > 0⇒ pCm > 0.
21Observe that under (27), the interval defined by (30) is always nonempty, which says
that KC < KB might indeed occur.
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{A,C} is feasible.22 Finally, we calculate KC − KA and observe that it is
positive if
(γ − θ) >
[
1 + 4λ
1 + 2λ
]
(θ − c)
ω
(50)
and negative otherwise. Inequality (50) and its reverse can be rewritten as
(32) and (33) respectively.23 As in ii), a crucial factor related to these con-
ditions is the sign of µ.
iv) If (26), (27) and (46), the latter being equivalent to (28), hold, then we
obtain joint feasibility of schemes A, B, and C.24 Next, we form KC −KA,
KC−KB, and KB−KA, using (37), (40), and (43). If condition (47), which
can be rewritten as (29), holds, we obtain KA < KB < KC. Now suppose
that (29) does not hold, i.e., (30) holds, and thus by ii) KB > KC. If, in
addition to (30), (32) holds, i.e.,[
1 + 4λ
1 + 2λ
]
(θ − c)
ω
< (γ − θ) <
[
(1 + λ)(1 + 2λ)
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) (51)
rewritten as (34), we obtain that KA < KC < KB.25 Finally, suppose that
both (29) and (32) do not hold, i.e.,[
(1 + λ)2
ω(1 + λ)− λ2
]
(θ − c) < (γ − θ) <
[
1 + 4λ
1 + 2λ
]
(θ − c)
ω
(52)
rewritten as (35), holds, then we obtain that KC < KA < KB.26
22Positivity of prices is here established by noting that (27) ⇒ pAm > 0, and qAm > 0 ⇒
qCm > 0⇒ pCm > 0.
23Again, to see that (33) defines a nonempty interval (i.e., that KC < KA may arise),
note that the inequality (1+ λ)θ+ λ(θ− c) < (1+ λ)θ+2λ(θ− c) + λ [θ − (c+ ω(γ − θ))]
is equivalent to (θ − c)/ω > (γ − θ)/2, which indeed is compatible with KC = KA and
hence for all capacity levels such that KC < KA.
24At this point it is clear that prices are strictly positive.
25Again, to see that KA < KC < KB may arise, note that nonemptiness of the interval
defined by (34) is equivalent to λ(γ − c) > (1− λ)(θ − c)− ω(γ − θ), which can be shown
to be compatible with capacity levels such that KC ≤ KB .
26To guarantee thatKC < KA < KB may indeed arise, note that the interval defined by
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This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Let us further discuss the intuition behind some of the statements in
Theorem 1. Scheme B being merely scheme A without the possibility of
using transfers, the result in Theorem 1-(i) says that higher capacity (in B)
compensates for the lack of transfers. Thus, the comparison of these two
schemes reveals that capacity and transfers are substitutes when it comes to
controlling monopoly power. Recall that for each comparison performed, we
first make sure that the appropriate control schemes are feasible, i.e., that at
the optimum they prescribe strictly positive prices, quantities and capacities.
For the case of schemes A and B, as indicated in the proof, it turns out that
feasibility is achieved if merely optimal monopoly production under scheme
B is strictly positive.
The reason why qBm > 0 is socially optimal can be analyzed by means
of condition (28). Indeed, observe that λ [(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)] is the
highest level of social marginal opportunity cost of capacity under scheme
B, namely, λ
[
sup{∂WB/∂K}
]
= λ
[
∂WB/∂K|qBm,KB=0
]
.27 Condition (28)
then says that it is optimal to allow the local monopoly to produce under
this scheme, if this social opportunity cost of capacity plus the social marginal
cost of production by the monopoly, (1 + λ)θ, is less than the highest level
of social marginal cost of imports, namely, (1 + λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)].
(35) being nonempty is equivalent to (1−λ)(θ−c)−ω(γ−θ) < λ(γ−c) < 2(θ−c)−ω(γ−θ)
or, since the left part of this inequality is always compatible with KC ≤ KA, λ(γ − c) <
2(θ − c)− ω(γ − θ).
27Social welfare under scheme B, denoted WB , can be computed by substituting (25)
into (11).
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For the case of B versus C (Theorem 1-(ii)), again feasibility of these
two schemes is achieved if qBm > 0, which is implied by (28). The reason
for this is that if it is socially optimal to let a monopoly produce when the
constraint of its profit maximization is not taken into account (scheme B),
then it will necessarily be the case under a scheme that explicitly accounts
for this constraint (scheme C).
To see the behavior of capacity under these two alternative schemes, let
us make more explicit the relationship between condition (29) and µ, the
shadow cost of the profit-maximization constraint under scheme C. We have
already mentioned in subsection 6.1 where we discussed the general case and
shown in the proof of statement 1-(ii), that the condition for KC −KB > 0
is identical to the one for µ > 0. Now, it is easy to show that given the
functional forms considered in this theorem, (25), ∂LC/∂K = ∂WB/∂K+µ,
where LC is the Lagrangian associated with the optimization program under
scheme C. By the envelope theorem ∂LC/∂K|K=KB = µ, where KB is
the optimal capacity under scheme B given by (40). Accordingly, when
µ > 0, the optimal capacity under scheme C, KC , must be greater than
under scheme B.
Now, note that this social marginal utility of capacity is positive if (high-
est) achievable social marginal cost of imports is greater than social marginal
cost of the local monopoly, plus the social opportunity cost (in terms of ca-
pacity) of distorting price away from marginal cost of the monopoly, plus the
highest level of social marginal opportunity cost of capacity under scheme
23
B.28 Given that (28) has to be satisfied, if (29) does not hold, we obtain (30)
which merely says that µ < 0, or equivalently, ∂LC/∂K|K=KB < 0, and thus
KC < KB.
Condition (31) in Theorem 1-(iii) ensures that qAm is positive. It says
that social marginal cost of the local monopoly plus social opportunity cost
of the foregone revenues due to monopoly production of an additional unit
(evaluated at KA = 0), θ − c = (pAm − c) − (pAm − θ), should be less than
highest achievable social marginal cost of imports.29 Again, to understand
the ranking of optimal capacity levels under schemes A and C, we examine
the relationship between the capacity gap and µ. From (6), (21), and (25),
we obtain ∂LC/∂K = ∂WA/∂K + λ(pm − θ) + µ. By the envelope theorem
∂LC/∂K|K=KA = λ(pm − θ) + µ, where KA is the optimal capacity under
scheme A given by (37). Therefore, optimal capacity under C must be greater
than under A if µ > −λ(pcm − θ).30 On the other hand, given that (31) has
to be satisfied, if (32) does not hold, we obtain (33) which is equivalent to
∂LC/∂K|K=KA < 0, leading to KC < KA.
The social marginal utility of capacity under scheme C (evaluated at
K = KA) will be positive if (highest) achievable social marginal cost of
imports is greater than social marginal cost of the local monopoly, plus twice
the social opportunity cost of foregone revenues due to production by the
28Note that since capacity allows to ship ”good” gas, it makes sense to use it in the
social measurement of opportunity costs.
29Both (pAm − c) and (pAm − θ) entail a social opportunity cost under scheme A because
these revenues are recoverable under this scheme that allows for transfers.
30Note that this condition, which has been discussed in the general case (see subsection
6.1), is a weaker condition than the one that implies KC −KB > 0. This suggests that
the outcome KC to the left of KB is ”more likely” than KC to the left of KA.
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monopoly of an extra unit (evaluated atKA = 0), plus this social opportunity
cost evaluated at maximum feasible capacity KA = γ − θ.
We conclude this discussion with an illustration of the argument under-
lying the results in Theorem 1-(iv). In order to compare schemes A, B, and
C, we first make sure that the scheme triple {A,B,C} is feasible. We do this
by relying on the already studied feasibility of the pairs {A,B}, {B,C}, and
{A,C}. It turns out that all that is needed is feasibility of the pair {B,C},
which is ensured by conditions (26)-(28). Since it is always the case that
KA < KB, we focus on the behavior of capacity levels only within the pairs
{A,C} and {B,C}. Figure 2 below visualizes the argument in the space of
values of (1+λ) [c+ ω(γ − θ)], the highest achievable social marginal cost of
imports already mentioned above.
-
-
-
-
{A,C}
{B,C}
{A,B,C}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
feasibility domain of {A,B,C} (KA < KB)
(1 + λ)θ + 2λ(θ − c)
+λ[θ − (c+ ω(γ − θ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
KC<KA
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KC>KA
(1 + λ)θ + λ[(1 + λ)(θ − c)]
+λ[(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
KC<KB
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KC>KB
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KC<KA<KB
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KA<KC<KB
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KA<KB<KC
(1 + λ)θ
+[(1 + λ)(θ − c) + λ(γ − θ)]
Figure 2: Comparison of capacity levels under schemes A, B, and C
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The upper-line of this figure characterizes the feasibility region of the
scheme triple {A,B,C}. The two intermediate lines show the regions that
determine the sign of the pairwise capacity gaps associated with the pairs
{A,C} and {B,C}. The regions shown in the bottom-line are merely found
as the intersection of those defined in the lines above it. Given that the
outcome KC < KA < KB is in some sense the most surprising, we examine
a bit more closely the likelihood of its occurrence. Recall that we have
shown that an additional inequality should hold for this outcome to arise
(see footnote 26). We simulated the behavior of this inequality, and the
results suggest that the ranking KC < KA < KB would correspond to low-
enough values of the cost of public funds so that social opportunity costs
from allowing the local monopoly to produce would be of small magnitude.31
6.3 Case 2: Linear demand, decreasing returns in gas
supply, constant returns in capacity building
In this subsection, we consider a second case that combines linear demand
with decreasing returns to scale in gas supply and constant returns to scale
in capacity building. Let us assume that
QM(pm) = γ − pm, Cm(qm) = θ
2
q2m, C(K) = ωK; γ, θ, ω > 0 (53)
The following theorem can then be stated:
Theorem 2 Under the assumptions described in (53), the optimal capacity
31For values of the slope of marginal cost of capacity building ω = 1/4, 1/2, 1, 3/2, we get
that the highest values of the social cost of public funds compatible with this inequality,
are approximately λ = 0.13, 0.20, 0.27, 0.34 respectively.
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levels KA, KB, and KC achieved under, respectively, schemes A, B, and C
are ordered as follows:
i) Assume that the following conditions hold
λ
1 + λ
<
θ
λ
[
1 + 2λ
1 + λ
]
(54)
c+ ω < γ (55)
(1 + λ)(c+ ω) > λ[λ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] (56)
λ(1 + λ) [θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] > λ2(c+ ω) (57)
Then, the pair of schemes {A,B} is feasible, and KA < KB.
ii) Assume that conditions (54)-(56) exhibited in i) and
λ(1 + λ) [θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] > 0 (58)
hold. Then, the scheme pair {B,C} is feasible. Moreover, if
0 < λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] < (1 + λ)2(c+ ω)− λ2γ (59)
then KB < KC. Otherwise, i.e., if
0 < (1 + λ)(c+ ω)− λ[λ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] <
λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] (60)
then, KB > KC.
iii) Suppose that conditions (54), (55), and (57) hold. Then, the pair {A,C}
is feasible. Moreover, if
λ2(c+ ω) < λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] <
(1 + λ)[(1 + λ) + λ(1 + 2λ)(2 + θ)2](c+ ω) (61)
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then KA < KC. Otherwise, i.e., if
λ[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] > [(1 + λ) + λ(1 + 2λ)(2 + θ)2](c+ ω) (62)
then KA > KC.
iv) Assume that conditions (54)-(57) stated in i) hold. Then, the scheme
triple {A,B,C} is feasible. Moreover, if
λ2(c+ ω) < λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] <
(1 + λ)2(c+ ω)− λ2γ (63)
then KA < KB < KC. If (63) is not satisfied but (61) is, or equivalently, if
(1 + λ)(c+ ω)− λ[λ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] <
λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] <
(1 + λ)[(1 + λ) + λ(1 + 2λ)(2 + θ)2](c+ ω) (64)
holds, then KA < KC < KB. Otherwise, if both (61) and (63) are not
satisfied, or equivalently, condition (62) is, then KC < KA < KB.
Proof 2 Using (53) and solving the first-order conditions corresponding to
schemes A, B, and C, yields the following closed-form solutions:
pAm =
[
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
]
(c+ ω) +
[
λ
1 + 2λ
]
γ (65)
KA =
[
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
]
[γ − (c+ ω)]− c+ ω
θ
(66)
qAm =
c+ ω
θ
(67)
pBm = (c+ ω) +
[
λ
(1 + 2λ)θ − λ2
]
[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] (68)
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KB =
[
1 + λ
(1 + 2λ)θ − λ2
]
[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] (69)
qBm =
(1 + 2λ)(c+ ω)− λ2[γ − (c+ ω)]
(1 + 2λ)θ − λ2 (70)
pCm = (c+ ω) +
λ(1 + θ)2[γ − (c+ ω)] + [1− λ(1 + θ)](c+ ω)
(1 + 2λ)(1 + θ)(2 + θ)− 1 (71)
KC =
(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2[γ − (c+ ω)]− [1 + (1 + λ)(2 + θ)]γ
(1 + 2λ)(1 + θ)(2 + θ)− 1 (72)
qCm =
(1 + λ)(2 + θ)(c+ ω) + λ(1 + θ)γ
(1 + 2λ)(1 + θ)(2 + θ)− 1 (73)
µ =
(1 + λ)[1 + λ(2 + θ)](c+ ω)− λ[λ+ (1 + λ)θ]γ
(1 + 2λ)(1 + θ)(2 + θ)− 1 (74)
The second-order conditions are always satisfied for scheme A, whereas for
schemes B and C they require θ(1 + 2λ) − λ2 > 0 which is equivalent to
condition (54) given in the theorem.
i) Given (54) and (55), from an examination of (68) and (69) we can see
that KB > 0⇒ pBm > 0, as the former is equivalent to
(γ − (c+ ω)) > c+ ω
θ
(75)
whereas the latter is equivalent to
(γ − (c+ ω)) > (c+ ω)
θ
[
λ2 − θ(1 + 2λ) + λ
λ
]
(76)
and, from (54), the term in brackets in (76) is less than one. Furthermore,
looking at (66) and (69) we have KA > 0⇒ KB > 0.32 Therefore, feasibility
of the scheme pair {A,B} is achieved if qBm, KA > 0, which is guaranteed by
conditions (56) and (57) given in the theorem. Now, we calculate the capacity
32Note that qAm and p
A
m are strictly positive.
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gap between schemes B and A, KB −KA, and we observe that it is positive
if
λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] > (1 + 2λ)(λ− θ)(c+ ω) (77)
In order to conclude that KB − KA is always positive within the feasibility
domain of the pair {A,B}, it suffices to show that any of the two feasibility
conditions, (56) and (57), implies (77), and hence that the latter can be
ignored. That (57) implies (77) is obvious from the expressions themselves.
To see that (77) is also implied by (56), merely rewrite (77) as
(1 + λ)θ(c+ ω) > λθ[λ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)]
−λ(1 + 2λ)[θ(γ − (c+ ω))− (c+ ω)] (78)
ii) Given (54) and (55), examining (69) and (72) allows us to conclude that
KB > 0⇒ KC > 0, as the first inequality amounts to (75) while the second
is equivalent to
(γ − (c+ ω)) > (c+ ω)
θ
[
θ(1 + (1 + λ)(2 + θ))
(1 + λ)(1 + θ)(2 + θ)− 1
]
(79)
and the term in brackets in (79) is less than one.33 Hence, feasibility of the
pair {B,C} is obtained if qBm > 0 and KB > 0, which are guaranteed by
conditions (56) and (58) given in the theorem. Next, we form KC − KB
which turns out to be positive if
(γ − (c+ ω)) < (c+ ω)
θ
[
θ(λ+ (1 + λ)2)
λ(λ+ θ(1 + λ))
]
(80)
rewritten as (59) when combined with feasibility conditions, and negative if
33Note that KB > 0⇒ pBm > 0, and pCm and qCm are strictly positive.
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(80) does not hold.34 In the case where (80) does not hold, meeting the con-
ditions that guarantee feasibility yields condition (60) given in the theorem.35
iii) Given (54) and (55), recall from, respectively, parts i) and ii) of this proof
that KA > 0⇒ KB > 0 and KB > 0⇒ KC > 0.36 Hence, KA > 0, ensured
by (57), guarantees that the pair composed of schemes A and C is feasible.
Next, making use of (66) and (72), we calculate the capacity differential
between schemes A and C and see that it is positive if
(γ − (c+ ω)) < (c+ ω)
θ
[
(1 + 2λ)(1 + λ(2 + θ)2)
λ
]
(81)
and negative otherwise. It is then easy to show that the inequality exhibited
in (81) and its reverse can be rewritten as (61) and (62) respectively.37
iv) From the previous parts of this proof, it is straightforward to see that
conditions (54)-(57) ensure feasibility of the scheme triple {A,B,C}. Next,
using (66), (69), and (72), we form KC−KA, KC−KB, and KB−KA. First,
suppose condition (63) holds. Then, since (63)⇒ (59) we have from ii) above
that KB < KC. Combining this with KA < KB, which is always true within
the feasibility domain, we conclude that KA < KB < KC.38 Now, assume
that condition (63) does not hold. Thus, we have either KA < KC < KB or
KC < KA < KB. If we further assume that (61) holds, the only possibility
left then is KA < KC < KB since (61) ⇒ KA < KC. It is easy to show
34We should point out that (56) ensures that the interval defined by the inequality (59)
is nonempty. Indeed, the reader can easily check that (1 + λ)2(c+ ω)− λ2γ > 0⇔ (56).
35Note that nonemptiness of the interval defined by (60) is implied by (58).
36Note that pAm, q
A
m, p
C
m, q
C
m > 0.
37It is also easy to show that the interval defined by the inequality (61) is nonempty.
38Using the same approach as in the proof of Theorem 1-(iv), the reader might verify
that the interval defined by condition (63) is nonempty by checking that the inequality
(1 + λ)2(c+ ω) > λ2[γ − (c+ ω)] is compatible with KC ≥ KB .
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that condition (63) not holding and (61) holding is equivalent to (64) given
in the theorem.39 Finally, assume that both conditions (61) and (63) are not
satisfied (thus KC < KA and KC < KB), or equivalently condition (62) is,
we find that KC < KA < KB.40
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
7 Summary of results and simulations
In the previous section we have provided, first at a general level and then
under some specific demand and cost conditions, a characterization of the
ordering of the capacity levels across the three control schemes A, B and C.41
Table 1 below recapitulates the ordering obtained under each of the three
economic scenarios considered, labelled Cases 1, 2 and 3, and the conditions
under which these orderings are obtained. We see from this table that while
KA is consistently smaller than KB, KC may be greater or smaller than both
KA and KB.
Cremer and Laffont (2002) have directed attention to this ambiguity is-
sue, although they have mainly focused on the ”excess” capacity case by
providing examples where the lack of price control leads to an over-sizing of
the pipeline network. In this paper, we have further investigated this issue of
network sizing by uncovering cases where network capacity and alternative
39It is straightforward to check that the interval defined by the inequality in condition
(64) is always nonempty.
40The reader can easily verify that the interval defined by (62) is strictly contained in
the feasibility domain.
41Cases 1 and 2 are analyzed in the previous section, whereas Case 3 is presented in the
appendix.
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instruments of market power control are both complements and substitutes.
In contrast to Cremer and Laffont’s study, our analysis allows us to identify
situations of both over- and under-sizing of the network.
It is easy to see that Cremer and Laffont’s comparison exercise is a special
case of the comparisons we have performed in this paper. Indeed, setting
λ = 0 in our modeling framework, we obtain scheme A as the first-best, and
B and C reduce to the schemes considered by the authors in their comparison,
namely, with and without price control.42 Moreover, a straight application of
Theorems 1-3 of this paper yields the unambiguous ”excess” capacity result
discussed by these authors, i.e., KC > KB in all of the three cases we have
analyzed.
42To be more precise, the specific case considered by Cremer and Laffont (2002) in their
footnote 7 corresponds to our Case 2, provided that λ = 0.
33
Table 1: Ordering of capacity levels
Available Case Conditions Implied
schemes ranking
(1) (26)-(28) KA < KB
{A, B} (2) (54)-(57) KA < KB
(3) (A.2)-(A.5) KA < KB
(1)
{
(26)-(29)
(26)-(28), (30)
KB < KC
KC < KB
{B, C} (2)
{
(54)-(56), (58), (59)
(54)-(56), (58), (60)
KB < KC
KC < KB
(3)
{
(A.2)-(A.4), (A.6), (A.7)
(A.2)-(A.4), (A.6), (A.8)
KB < KC
KC < KB
(1)
{
(26), (27), (31), (32)
(26), (27), (31), (33)
KA < KC
KC < KA
{A, C} (2)
{
(54), (55), (57), (61)
(54), (55), (57), (62)
KA < KC
KC < KA
(3)
{
(A.2), (A.3), (A.5), (A.9)
(A.2), (A.3), (A.5), (A.10)
KA < KC
KC < KA
(1)

(26)-(29)
(26)-(28), (34)
(26)-(28), (35)
KA < KB < KC
KA < KC < KB
KC < KA < KB
{A, B, C} (2)

(54)-(57), (63)
(54)-(57), (64)
(54)-(57), (62)
KA < KB < KC
KA < KC < KB
KC < KA < KB
(3)

(A.2)-(A.5), (A.11)
(A.2)-(A.5), (A.12)
(A.2)-(A.5), (A.10)
KA < KB < KC
KA < KC < KB
KC < KA < KB
While capacity is an important variable to analyze from both a theoretical
and institutional standpoint, it is also instructive to examine the behavior of
the other endogenous variables, namely, natural gas price and output levels
in the regional market. In the remainder of this section, we summarize some
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simulations that we have performed, by taking a particular specification of
Case 1 (see (25)) with ω = 1 and γ − θ = 5. The motivation for taking a
specific value (equal to 5) for the maximum price-cost margin of the local
monopoly, γ − θ, stems from noting that the closed-form solutions of the
welfare-maximization programs corresponding to schemes A, B, and C (see
(36)-(44)) are expressed in terms of this price-cost margin, the monopoly’s
marginal cost, θ, and the gap between the marginal cost of the monopoly
and the competitive market, θ−c.43 Setting the maximum price-cost margin
equal to 5 yields the expressions for capacity, local output, and price levels
exhibited in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Capacity, local output, and price levels
Scheme A Scheme B Scheme C
K (θ − c)
[
1+λ
1+λ−λ2
]
(θ − c) 5(1+λ)
5+8λ
+
[
4(1+λ)
5+8λ
]
(θ − c)
qm
5(1+λ)
1+2λ
− (θ − c) 5−
[
(1+λ)2
1+λ−λ2
]
(θ − c) 5(2+3λ)
5+8λ
−
[
2(1+λ)
5+8λ
]
(θ − c)
pm θ +
5λ
1+2λ
θ +
[
λ(1+λ)
1+λ−λ2
]
(θ − c) θ + 5(2+3λ)
5+8λ
−
[
2(1+λ)
5+8λ
]
(θ − c)
This table shows some quite interesting comparative statics effects. In-
deed, letting ∆ ≡ θ−c, under scheme A, we see that an increase in ∆ leads to
an increase in capacity and a decrease in monopoly output of the same mag-
nitude, and hence price in the regional market remains unchanged. Under
scheme B, the increase in capacity is smaller than the decrease in monopoly
output, leading to an increase in price. Finally, under scheme C, the implied
43The marginal-cost differential, θ − c, is at the heart of the policy that is the subject
of this paper, consisting of controlling market power with gas imports.
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capacity increase more than offsets the local output decrease with a resulting
net effect of decreasing the local market price.
For the purpose of exploring the cross-effect of the marginal-cost gap (∆)
and the shadow cost of public funds (λ), we perform some simulations using
the grid λ = 1/5, 1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 1.44 Tables 3, 4, and 5 present, respectively,
the levels of capacity, local monopoly output, and price in terms of ∆ for
values of the cost of public funds in this grid.
Table 3: Optimal capacity levels
Scheme A Scheme B Scheme C
λ = 1
5
∆ 30
29
∆ 1
33
(35 + 24∆)
λ = 1
4
∆ 20
19
∆ 5
14
(3 + 2∆)
λ = 1
3
∆ 12
11
∆ 1
23
(25 + 16∆)
λ = 1
2
∆ 6
5
∆ 2
9
(5 + 3∆)
λ = 1 ∆ 2∆ 1
13
(15 + 8∆)
44For simplicity of the presentation, we set θ = 5.
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Table 4: Optimal local monopoly output
Scheme A Scheme B Scheme C
λ = 1
5
30
7
−∆ 5− 36
29
∆ 1
33
(65− 12∆)
λ = 1
4
25
6
−∆ 5− 25
19
∆ 5
28
(11− 2∆)
λ = 1
3
4−∆ 5− 16
11
∆ 1
23
(45− 8∆)
λ = 1
2
15
4
−∆ 5− 9
5
∆ 1
18
(35− 6∆)
λ = 1 10
3
−∆ 5− 4∆ 1
13
(25− 4∆)
Table 5: Optimal price levels
Scheme A Scheme B Scheme C
λ = 1
5
40
7
5 + 6
29
∆ 2
33
(115− 6∆)
λ = 1
4
35
6
5 + 5
19
∆ 85
28
(39− 2∆)
λ = 1
3
6 5 + 4
11
∆ 8
23
(20−∆)
λ = 1
2
25
4
5 + 3
5
∆ 1
18
(125− 6∆)
λ = 1 20
3
5 + 2∆ 1
13
(90− 4∆)
As far as schemes A and B are concerned, Tables 3-5 confirm what is
already conveyed by Table 2. First, we see that optimal capacity (local
output) level is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in the cost of public
funds. However, since the local output effect dominates the capacity effect,
this results in a monotonically increasing regional market price. In contrast,
under scheme C, this monotonicity property does not hold. Indeed, from
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Table 2 we find that ∂KC/∂λ = (10− 12∆)/(5 + 8λ)2 and ∂qCm/∂λ = (−5 +
6∆)/(5 + 8λ)2, implying, as can be checked in Tables 3 and 4, that capacity
(local output) is increasing (decreasing) in λ for ∆ < 5/6, and decreasing
(increasing) for ∆ > 5/6. The output effect being twice as large as the
capacity effect in magnitude, thanks to our assumption of unitary-slope linear
demand, we obtain a behavioral pattern for the optimal price analogous to
that of the local output.45
While the main focus of this paper is on the ranking of capacity across
alternative control schemes, our knowledge of the behavior of the two other
endogenous variables, monopoly output and market price, allows us to ex-
amine their ranking as well. Tables 6-8 give the ordering of, respectively,
capacity, local output, and price in terms of ∆. A striking feature of the
data contained in these tables is that while capacity (as found in Theorems
1-3) is ranked in three different manners, monopoly output is ranked in four
manners and price in two (see the columns of Tables 6-8). Figure 3 below
displays these different rankings in the ∆-line, for any value of λ. Figures
4-6 illustrate these orderings for the case where λ = 1/4. These figures also
highlight the role played by the sign of µ, the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the profit-maximization constraint under scheme C.
45This lack of monotonicity of the endogenous variables with respect to the cost of public
funds under scheme C confirms the capacity rankings documented in the previous section.
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Table 6: Ranking of optimal capacity levels
KA < KB < KC KA < KC < KB KC < KA < KB
λ = 1
5
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 145
42
145
42
< ∆ ≤ 35
9
35
9
< ∆ ≤ 145
36
λ = 1
4
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 19
6
19
6
< ∆ ≤ 15
4
15
4
< ∆ ≤ 19
5
λ = 1
3
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 11
4
11
4
< ∆ ≤ 55
16
NF ∗
λ = 1
2
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 25
12
25
12
< ∆ ≤ 25
9
NF
λ = 1 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 5
6
5
6
< ∆ ≤ 5
4
NF
∗ Nonfeasible.
Table 7: Ranking of optimal local monopoly output
qCm < q
A
m < q
B
m q
C
m < q
B
m < q
A
m q
B
m < q
C
m < q
A
m q
B
m < q
A
m < q
C
m
λ = 1
5
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 145
49
145
49
< ∆ ≤ 145
42
145
42
< ∆ ≤ 535
147
535
147
< ∆ ≤ 145
36
λ = 1
4
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 95
36
95
36
< ∆ ≤ 19
6
19
6
< ∆ ≤ 185
54
185
54
< ∆ ≤ 19
5
λ = 1
3
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 11
5
11
5
< ∆ ≤ 11
4
11
4
< ∆ ≤ 47
15
47
15
< ∆ ≤ 55
16
λ = 1
2
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 25
16
25
16
< ∆ ≤ 25
12
25
12
< ∆ ≤ 65
24
65
24
< ∆ ≤ 25
9
λ = 1 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 5
9
5
9
< ∆ ≤ 5
6
5
6
< ∆ ≤ 5
4
NF
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Table 8: Ranking of optimal price levels
pBm < p
A
m < p
C
m p
C
m < p
A
m < p
B
m
λ = 1
5
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 145
42
145
42
< ∆ ≤ θ
λ = 1
4
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 19
6
19
6
< ∆ ≤ θ
λ = 1
3
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 11
4
11
4
< ∆ ≤ θ
λ = 1
2
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 25
12
25
12
< ∆ ≤ θ
λ = 1 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ 5
6
5
6
< ∆ ≤ θ
-
-
-
-
µ<0︷ ︸︸ ︷ µ>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
5(1 + λ− λ2)
1 + 3λ+ 2λ2
5(1 + 2λ)
1 + 4λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
KA<KB<KC
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KA<KC<KB
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KC<KA<KB
5(1 + λ− λ2)
(1 + 2λ)2
5(3 + 6λ+ 2λ2)
3(1 + 2λ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
qCm<q
A
m<q
B
m
︸ ︷︷ ︸
qCm<q
B
m<q
A
m
︸ ︷︷ ︸
qBm<q
C
m<q
A
m
︸ ︷︷ ︸
qBm<q
A
m<q
C
m
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pBm<p
A
m<p
C
m
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pCm<p
A
m<p
B
m
0
0
0
0
Figure 3: Ranking of capacity, output, and price for any λ
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Figure 5: Ranking of output for λ = 1/4
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Figure 6: Ranking of price for λ = 1/4
8 Conclusion
The gas industry, throughout the world, and particularly so, in Europe, has
been facing an important question that is common to most of the network
industries. In a context where some segments of the industry are increasingly
open to competition, how to make sure that monopoly power, inherited from
the historical market structure that prevailed prior to the reforms, is not
going to be exercised. This paper has paved the road for a thorough analysis
of the means to mitigate this type of monopoly behavior in the gas industry
by analyzing the extent to which network sizing is an effective weapon to
control market power.
As a starting point, we have considered a situation where a planner makes
transfers between consumers and a regional monopoly, controls the firm’s
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output/price, and sets the capacity of a pipeline that is used to bring in some
competitive gas into the regional market. We then have examined the effect
on this pipeline capacity of preventing the planner from using transfers and
controlling price. The analysis sheds light on the question of whether these
various means of mitigating regional monopoly power in the gas industry are
complements or substitutes. Our main finding is that restricting the set of
control instruments does not always result in an ”over”-sized network.
Control of monopoly power is to a large extent the subject of regulatory
economics. The purpose of this paper was to initiate a process aimed at better
understanding the interaction among regulatory tools under the admittedly
strong assumption of complete information. A necessary step in our future
research agenda is to introduce asymmetric information, a milestone of the
new view of regulation (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993).46 Our conjecture
is that the introduction of information incompleteness will affect in some
important ways the effectiveness of the regulatory instruments introduced in
this paper, but how and to what degree remains to be seen.
46In some work progress of ours (Gasmi et al., 2003), we have begun exploring this
avenue of research.
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Appendix
Case 3: Linear demand, decreasing returns in both gas
supply and capacity building
For the purpose of confirming the lack of stability of the capacity ranking of
scheme C, in this appendix we consider an economic environment where de-
mand is linear, and both gas supply and capacity building exhibit decreasing
returns. We then consider that
QM(pm) = γ − pm, Cm(qm) = θ
2
q2m, C(K) =
ω
2
K2; γ, θ, ω > 0 (A.1)
from which we derive the results stated in the next theorem.47
Theorem 3 Under the assumptions described in (A.1), the optimal capacity
levels KA, KB, and KC achieved under, respectively, schemes A, B, and C
are ordered as follows:
i) Assume that the following conditions are met
λ
1 + λ
<
ω
λ
+ θ
[
λ+ (1 + λ)(1 + ω)
λ(1 + λ)
]
(A.2)
c < γ (A.3)
(1 + λ)(c+ ωγ) > λ[λ(γ − c)− c] (A.4)
λ(1 + λ) [θ(γ − c)− c] > λ2c (A.5)
Then, the pair of control schemes {A,B} is feasible, and KA < KB.
47Because the proof of this theorem is very similar to that of Theorems 1 and 2 given
in the text, it is only sketched in this appendix.
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ii) Assume that conditions (A.2)-(A.4), and
λ(1 + λ) [θ(γ − c)− c] > 0 (A.6)
hold. Then, the scheme pair {B,C} is feasible. Moreover, if
0 < λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c] < (1 + λ)(c+ ωγ)− λ[λ(γ − c)− c] (A.7)
then KB < KC. Otherwise, i.e., if
0 < (1 + λ)(c+ ωγ)− λ[λ(γ − c)− c] < λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c] (A.8)
then KB > KC.
iii) Suppose that conditions (A.2), (A.3), and (A.5) hold. Then, schemes A
and C are feasible. Moreover, if
λ2c < λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c] < (1 + λ)[1 + λ(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2](c+ ωγ)
+λ[1 + λ(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2]c+ λ2c
(A.9)
then KA < KC. Otherwise, i.e., if
λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c] > (1 + λ)[1 + λ(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2](c+ ωγ)
+λ[1 + λ(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2]c+ λ2c
(A.10)
then KA > KC.
iv) Suppose that the same conditions as those stated in i) above hold. Then,
the scheme triple {A,B,C} is feasible. Moreover, if
λ2c < λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c] < (1 + λ)(c+ ωγ)− λ[λ(γ − c)− c] (A.11)
holds, then KA < KB < KC. If (A.11) does not hold and (A.9) holds, i.e.,
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(1 + λ)(c+ ωγ)− λ[λ(γ − c)− c] < λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c] <
(1 + λ)[1 + λ(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2](c+ ωγ)
+λ[1 + λ(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2]c+ λ2c
(A.12)
holds, then KA < KC < KB. Finally, if both conditions (A.11) and (A.9)
do not hold, or equivalently, (A.10) is satisfied, then KC < KA < KB.
Proof 3 Using (A.1) and solving the first-order conditions associated with
each of the three schemes A, B, and C, yields the following closed-form
solutions:
pAm =
λγ(θ + ω) + (1 + λ)θ(c+ ωγ)
(1 + 2λ)(θ + ω) + (1 + λ)θω
(A.13)
KA =
(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c]− λc
(1 + 2λ)(θ + ω) + (1 + λ)θω
(A.14)
qAm =
(1 + λ)(c+ ωγ) + λc
(1 + 2λ)(θ + ω) + (1 + λ)θω
(A.15)
pBm =
(1 + λ)θ(c+ ωγ) + λ[θ(γ − c)− c] + λc(θ − λ)
ω(1 + λ)− λ2 + θ[1 + 2λ+ ω(1 + λ)] (A.16)
KB =
(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c]
ω(1 + λ)− λ2 + θ[1 + 2λ+ ω(1 + λ)] (A.17)
qBm =
(1 + λ)(c+ ωγ)− λ[λ(γ − c)− c]
ω(1 + λ)− λ2 + θ[1 + 2λ+ ω(1 + λ)] (A.18)
pCm =
(1 + λ)(1 + θ)(2 + θ)(c+ ωγ) + λ(1 + θ)2γ
θ + (1 + θ)2 + (1 + λ)ω(2 + θ)2 + 2λ(1 + θ)(2 + θ)
(A.19)
KC =
(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2(γ − c)− [1 + (1 + λ)(2 + θ)]γ
θ + (1 + θ)2 + (1 + λ)ω(2 + θ)2 + 2λ(1 + θ)(2 + θ)
(A.20)
qCm =
(1 + λ)(2 + θ)(c+ ωγ) + λ(1 + θ)γ
θ + (1 + θ)2 + (1 + λ)ω(2 + θ)2 + 2λ(1 + θ)(2 + θ)
(A.21)
µ =
(1 + λ)(c+ ωγ)− λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c]− λ[λ(γ − c)− c]
θ + (1 + θ)2 + (1 + λ)ω(2 + θ)2 + 2λ(1 + θ)(2 + θ)
(A.22)
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The second-order conditions are always satisfied for scheme A. For schemes
B and C they require
ω(1 + λ)− λ2 + θ[1 + 2λ+ ω(1 + λ)] > 0 (A.23)
which is equivalent to condition (A.2) given in the theorem.
i) In order to compare schemes A and B, we first make sure that they are
feasible, i.e., that they prescribe positive prices, capacity, and output levels
given by (A.13)-(A.18). Given (A.2) and (A.3), we have KB > 0⇒ pBm > 0,
as the former is equivalent to
(γ − c) > c
θ
(A.24)
whereas the latter amounts to
(γ − c) > c
θ
[
λ(1 + λ)− θ(1 + 2λ+ ω(1 + λ)
λ+ ω(1 + λ)
]
(A.25)
and, from (A.2), the term in brackets in (A.25) is less than one. Further-
more, we have KA > 0⇒ KB > 0, as can be seen from (A.14) and (A.17).48
Therefore, feasibility of schemes A and B is achieved if qBm > 0 and K
A > 0,
which, respectively, are ensured by conditions (A.4) and (A.5). Now, we
calculate the capacity gap KB −KA and find that it is positive if
λ(1 + λ)[θ(γ − c)− c] + (1 + λ)θ(c+ ωγ) + λθc > λ2c (A.26)
a condition that can be ignored given feasibility of the scheme pair {A,B}.49
48Note that qAm and p
A
m are strictly positive.
49The argument that justifies why this condition should be ignored is similar to the one
provided in the proof of Theorem 2-(i).
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ii) Given (A.2) and (A.3), we have KB > 0⇒ KC > 0, as the first inequality
is equivalent to (A.24) while the second amounts to
(γ − c) > c
θ
[
θ[(1 + λ)(2 + θ) + 1]
θ[(1 + λ)(2 + θ) + 1] + 1 + λ(2 + θ)
]
(A.27)
and the term in brackets in (A.27) is less than one.50 Thus, feasibility of
schemes B and C is obtained if qBm > 0 and K
B > 0, which, respectively,
hold if conditions (A.4) and (A.6) are satisfied. Now, making use of (A.17)
and (A.20), we express the capacity gap KC −KB and see that it is positive
if
(1 + λ)[c(1 + λ(2 + θ)) + ωγ] > λ[λ+ (1 + λ)θ]γ, (A.28)
which, combined with feasibility conditions, can be rewritten as (A.7), and
negative if (A.28) does not hold. When (A.28) does not hold, meeting the
conditions that ensure feasibility, we obtain (A.8).51
iii) Given (A.2) and (A.3), recall from, respectively, parts i) and ii) of this
proof that KA > 0⇒ KB > 0, and, KB > 0⇒ KC > 0.52 Next, making use
of (A.14) and (A.20), we calculate the capacity gap KC −KA and see that
it is positive if
[1 + λ(1 + λ)(2 + θ)2]ωγ + [1 + λ(2 + θ) + λ(1 + 2λ)(2 + θ)2]c > λγθ (A.29)
and negative otherwise. Inequality (A.29) and its reverse, merged with the
conditions that ensure feasibility can be respectively rewritten as (A.9) and
(A.10) given in the theorem.53
50Note that KB > 0⇒ pBm > 0, and pCm and qCm are strictly positive.
51Nonemptiness of the intervals defined by (A.7) and (A.8) is guaranteed by, respectively,
(A.4) and (A.6).
52Note that pAm, q
A
m, p
C
m, and q
C
m are strictly positive.
53It can be easily shown that, within the feasibility domain, the interval defined by (A.9)
is always nonempty.
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iv) Clearly, conditions (A.2)-(A.5) imply feasibility of schemes A, B and C.
Next, we form KC−KA, KC−KB, and KB−KA, using (A.14), (A.17), and
(A.20). First, suppose condition (A.11) holds. Then, since (A.11) ⇒ (A.7)
we have from ii) above that KB < KC. Combining this with KA < KB, which
is always true within the feasibility domain, we conclude that KA < KB <
KC.54 Now, assume that condition (A.11) is not satisfied. Then, two cases
are possible: KA < KC < KB and KC < KA < KB. If we further assume
that (A.9) holds, we are left only with the case KA < KC < KB since (A.9)
⇒ KA < KC. It is easy to show that condition (A.9) not holding and (A.11)
holding is equivalent to (A.12).55 Finally, assume that both conditions (A.9)
and (A.11) do not hold (thus KC < KA and KC < KB), or equivalently
condition (A.10) does, we find that KC < KA < KB.56
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
54The interval defined by (A.11) can be shown, in the same way as in Theorem 1-(iv),
to be nonempty.
55A casual look at inequality (A.12) reveals that the interval it spans is nonempty.
56The reader can easily verify that the interval defined by (A.10) is strictly contained
in the feasibility domain.
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